Bueno, basta de teoría jurídica. Ahí va algo de mi grupo de la adolescencia, al que también sigo escuchando ahora. AGUANTE LA RENGA.
HICE UN LUGAR EN EL REFUGIO DE MIS SUEÑOS
Y GUARDÉ AHÍ MI TESORO MÁS PRECIADO
DONDE NO LLEGA EL HOMBRE CON SUS JAULAS
NI LA MAQUINARIA DE LA SUPERVIVENCIA
ME FUE MÁS FÁCIL INTENTAR LA VIDA
QUE VENDERLA AL INTELECTO Y LA CONFORMIDAD
Y AHORA SÓLO UN CAMINO HE DE CAMINAR:
CUALQUIER CAMINO QUE TENGA CORAZÓN
ATRAVEZANDO TODO SU LARGO SIN ALIENTO
DEJANDO ATRÁS MIL RAZONES EN EL TIEMPO
Y MORIR QUERIENDO SER LIBRE
ENCONTRAR MI LADO SALVAJE
PONERLE ALAS A MI DESTINO
ROMPER LOS DIENTES DE ESTE ENGRANAJE....
La primera vez que escuché este tema en vivo (Ferro 2000) se me puso la piel de gallina. De hecho, La Renga fue el único grupo que me puso la piel de gallina en vivo (ni los Redondos).
QUE LOCO QUE LA CLASE DE LIBERTAD DE LA QUE TAN BIEN SE HABLA EN ESTE TEMA ES LA LIBERTAD NEGATIVA, TAN DEFENDIDA, POR EJEMPLO, POR ROBERT NOZICK.
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What is Jurisprudence?
I find jurisprudence –as the study of philosophical problems about the law- most helpfully thought of on the model of philosophy of science. The philosopher of science, typically at least, does not critique scientific theories or engage in scientific work itself. What he typically does do, however, is examine two broad types of issues: epistemological and ontological. First, he tries to describe and assess –in epistemic terms- the ‘methods’ scientists employ to discover ‘truths’ about the world. Thus, for example, philosophers of science frequently ask questions like: What is involved in ‘confirming’ a theory? What constitutes giving an ‘explanation’ of a phenomenon? Secondly, the philosopher of science tries to determine the ontological commitments scientific theories of science actually do have, or ought to have. Are scientific theories, for example, literally true, or should we conceive of the unobservable entites they posit as merely ‘useful fictions’?
If we take jurisprudence to stand in an analogous relationship to law, then we might say that the jurisprudent does not critique substantive legal doctrines or engage in legal work itself (eg arguing or deciding cases), but rather: (i) studies, elucidates, and perhaps critiques or revises the methods used by lawyers and judges to ‘discover’ legal conclusions (eg the methods of legal reasoning, of legal interpretation, etc.); and (ii) examines the ontological commitments actually manifest in the law or that ought to be part of our conception of law (eg what is the status of a claim like ‘Leiter is liable for his negligence in this case’ or, more generally, what is it to say that law ‘exists’ on some point.) To take these questions as central to jurisprudence is to take the rich tradition of theories of adjudication and of law associated with names like Austin, Kelsen, Hart, Raz, and Dworkin as central to jurisprudence. This understanding of jurisprudence does, happily, make a place for the Legal Realists and some of their heirs, writers who can be understood, for example, as launching skeptical attacks upon the claims of ‘method’ in lawyering and judging. At the same time, much of the literature of ‘policy science’, of law and economics, of Legal Process, and of feminism and critical race theory –whatever its intrinsic interest- turns out not to be jurisprudential at all. Such work is, more often, a contribution to political or constitutional theory, to legal pedagogy or to the actual development of substantive law. Such literature, however, sheds no special light on the methods of legal reasoning or the ontological commitments of lawyers and judges.
Brian Leiter in "Is THere an 'American' JUrisprudence?
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